Empirical/QM: E91 finite-sample (finite-key) concentration #
Category: 3-Local (QM-validity content, no CSD ontology).
The asymptotic key rate E91.e91_key_rate_pos_of_chsh takes the true CHSH
value S as given. A real device-independent QKD run does not see S; it
estimates it from n finite rounds. This module supplies the missing
finite-sample bridge: the empirical CHSH estimator Ŝₙ concentrates around the
true S exponentially in n, so the probability of failing to certify a
genuine violation decays like exp(−n ε² / (2c)).
Model (minimal and honest) #
A run is a sequence of per-round CHSH statistics Y : ℕ → Ω → ℝ. Each round's
statistic is
- bounded:
Y i ω ∈ [a, b]almost surely (a ≤ b); the widthb − ais the range of the per-round CHSH correlator combination (modelling choice — e.g. the standard randomized-setting unbiased per-round estimator lands in a fixed bounded interval). The Hoeffding constant isc = ((b − a)/2)²; - unbiased:
μ[Y i] = S(the true CHSH value); - independent:
iIndepFun Y μ(the per-round independence is a modelling hypothesis, exactly the i.i.d.-rounds assumption; it is what the sub-Gaussianadd/sum API consumes — the same independence idiom LF1 threads).
Ŝₙ = (∑_{i<n} Yᵢ) / n is the empirical CHSH estimator (empiricalCHSH).
What this delivers #
e91_chsh_concentration— the headline: a genuine Hoeffding tail,μ.real {ω | Ŝₙ ω ≤ S − ε} ≤ exp(−n ε² / (2·((b−a)/2)²)), proved through Mathlib's sub-Gaussian pipeline (Hoeffding's lemmahasSubgaussianMGF_of_mem_Icc_of_integral_eq_zeroper round, summed withmeasure_sum_range_ge_le_of_iIndepFun, the Chernoffmeasure_ge_letail). The exponent genuinely decays inn(linear inn, constantc = ((b−a)/2)² > 0whenevera < b).e91_finite_key_confidence— the bridge: for a true violation2 < S ≤ 2√2, (1) the asymptotic rate is positive (e91_key_rate_pos_of_chsh), (2) the failure-to-certify probabilityμ.real {ω | Ŝₙ ω ≤ 2}is≤ exp(−n (S−2)²/(2·((b−a)/2)²)), and (3) the estimator certifies (2 < Ŝₙ) with probability≥ 1 − exp(−n (S−2)²/…). The failure probability is exponentially small in the number of rounds.
Honest scope #
This is finite-sample confidence: Hoeffding concentration of the CHSH
estimator. It is not a composable finite-key security proof. A full
finite-key analysis (Renner smooth min-entropy, the leftover-hash / privacy-
amplification accounting, the entropy-accumulation theorem) needs infrastructure
Mathlib does not have; none of it is claimed here. The per-round independence and
boundedness are explicit modelling hypotheses (not derived). QM-validity
inner-product layer; no CSD ontology. Foundational triple only (no busch).
Source #
Hoeffding 1963; Pironio et al. 2009 (DIQKD finite-key); Tomamichel–Lim– Gisin–Renner 2012 (composable finite-key, not formalised here).
The empirical CHSH estimator over n rounds: the sample mean of the
per-round CHSH statistics Y, Ŝₙ(ω) = (∑_{i<n} Yᵢ ω) / n.
Equations
- CSD.Empirical.QM.E91.empiricalCHSH Y n ω = (∑ i ∈ Finset.range n, Y i ω) / ↑n
Instances For
E91 finite-sample CHSH concentration (Hoeffding tail). For n bounded
(Y i ∈ [a,b] a.s.), unbiased (μ[Y i] = S), independent (iIndepFun Y μ)
per-round CHSH statistics, the empirical estimator Ŝₙ deviates below the true
value S by ε ≥ 0 with exponentially small probability:
μ.real {ω | Ŝₙ ω ≤ S − ε} ≤ exp(−n ε² / (2·((b−a)/2)²)).
The Hoeffding constant is c = ((b−a)/2)² (the per-round sub-Gaussian
parameter). The exponent is linear in n and strictly negative for ε > 0,
a < b, so the bound genuinely decays. Proved by Hoeffding's lemma
(hasSubgaussianMGF_of_mem_Icc_of_integral_eq_zero, per round, on the centered
variable S − Y i) + the i.i.d. sub-Gaussian Hoeffding sum
(measure_sum_range_ge_le_of_iIndepFun, which is the Chernoff measure_ge_le
tail of the summed sub-Gaussian).
E91 finite-key confidence (the bridge). For a true CHSH violation
2 < S ≤ 2√2 certified by independent, bounded, unbiased per-round statistics:
- the asymptotic DI secret-key rate is strictly positive
(
e91_key_rate_pos_of_chsh); - the failure-to-certify probability — the empirical estimator landing at or
below the classical ceiling
2— is exponentially small inn,μ.real {ω | Ŝₙ ω ≤ 2} ≤ exp(−n (S−2)² / (2·((b−a)/2)²)); - equivalently, the estimator certifies (
2 < Ŝₙ) with probability≥ 1 − exp(−n (S−2)² / (2·((b−a)/2)²)).
This is the finite-round content: the asymptotic positive key rate plus a finite-sample confidence that the estimate witnesses the violation. It is not composable finite-key security (no smooth min-entropy / leftover hashing); see the module docstring.